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THE LEGALITY OF ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR
TESTS - A CRITICAL VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE COLD WAR*
PETER J. FLIESS* *

Since the end of the Second World War we have been forced to
witness the dilemma facing American statesmen in their efforts to
act in accordance with both expediency and law. These traditionally
staunch supporters of international law as the chief guarantor of
universal and perennial peace have recently begun to waver. Much
to their dismay, they have discovered that it has become increasingly
difficult to reconcile the law with American security. Last year's
abortive Cuban venture and direct intervention in the internal affairs
of that country, which may become necessary in the years ahead, are
not easy to square with the rules of international law. Likewise, it requires more than average ingenuity to harmonize our Cuban policy
with the Government's stand during the Suez episode of a few years
ago. Similar difficulties might have arisen in the Congo had Lumumba lived and carried out his threat to invite the interposition of
Soviet military forces. But the dilemma is perhaps nowhere greater
than in the realm of nuclear war, and more particularly in the area
of nuclear tests in preparation for such a war.
In examining the compatibility of nuclear tests with existing international law, I shall confine myself to a consideration of the applicable customary norms and treaty norms as far as they can be considered as having been embodied in the general law of nations. This,
to be sure, does not cover the entire range of problems created by
such tests, but it may suffice to throw some light upon the issue at
hand. Although it is conceivable that treaty law can be construed to
limit further the freedom of the nuclear powers, it is the general
law that ultimately sets the pattern, especially as long as Red China
is barred from conversations among the organized powers of the world.
I shall furthermore base my observations on two assumptions.

The first is that atmospheric nuclear tests are scientifically and politically necessary. This is a moot question, of course, and I am far
from equipped to argue the point. However, enough eminent students have supported the necessity of such tests to justify making
that assumption for the sake of the argument,' and only recently
*Paper delivered at the Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, March 1, 1962.
**B.A. 1944, Stanford University; M.A. 1947, Ph.D. 1951, Harvard University;
Professor of Government, Louisiana State University.
1. Cf. Kissinger, Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace, 37 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1-18 (1958).
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President Kennedy has been called upon to settle the controvers)
between the scientists favoring and those opposing resumption of
testing. The issue is not only difficult to judge but is also likely to
remain controversial, inasmuch as scientific competence and talent
2
seem to be evenly divided between the two camps..
Second, I shall assume that such tests, if conducted with some
frequency and on a large scale, will have adverse effects upon the
health, procreative capacity, and food supplies of people in various
parts of the earth. Again, I am not prepared to judge the extent of
the danger arising in remote areas from radioactive pollution of the
air. However, there seems to be some measure of agreement that the
extent of the fall-out effect is unpredictable and uncontrollable, 3 that
the magnitude of the tests prevents them from being conducted within
the area of the experimenting state,4 and that the effects are measureable in many parts of the world. 5 Although the genetic consequences
of individual explosions are said to be negligible, it appears that the
long-range results of strontium-90, which remains radioactive for a
period of approximately thirty years, will produce a cumulative dosage
having harmful effects upon the health of people and causing mutations throughout the world.6 "Clean" bombs may minimize the risk,
but it is doubtful that they will eliminate it. A grim forecast of the
destructive effect of radioactive pollution of the air was made by the
eminent scientist Albert Einstein, and many scientists of note have
since accepted his pessimistic view, as evinced by growing protests
against nuclear tests throughout the world.8 Both of these assumptions
are necessary if the tests are considered a fundamental legal problem
too complex to be disposed of by agreements between rational and
well-intentioned men.
With these assumptions in mind, we must raise the question as to
what rights of states and individuals are likely to be affected by atmospheric tests. Turning first to states, we find that both their
sovereignty over their own territory and their rights on the high seas
are involved. There can be no question that in time of peace the
state is free to use its territory as it sees fit, unless its activities interfere with the rights of other sovereignties. It is also well established
that in time of peace the high seas are equally accessible to all sovereign states, either as res millius or res communis. As we move into
the aerial realm, things become more nebulous. The argument as to
2.
3.

Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1962, p. 1, col. 6.
SINGH, NUCLEAR

VEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

28 (1959).

4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 228.
6.
7.
1URTER

8.

Id. at 37.
Burkhardt, Die Veriinderung der IWelt durch die Atornwafjen, 14 FRANKHEFTE 713 (1959).
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 377 n.256 (1959).
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whether the air is to be treated on the basis of analogies with land or
sea has presently been settled; rules concordant with those governing
the status of the subjacent area appear to be favored. In other words,
the air above land is to be under the complete jurisdiction of the
subjacent territorial state, while the air above the sea is to be as free
as the sea beneath it. The fact that the United States has found it
necessary to close certain areas of the high seas temporarily in order
to prevent injury to persons as well as the inevitable contamination
of fish has been challenged by some writers as a violation of the
freedom of the sea. 9 Although the criticism has been directed mainly
against subaqueous explosions, the argument is applicable to atmospheric tests as far as they pollute the air over the sea.
An eloquent defense of the American right to conduct subaqueous tests has been made by McDougal and Schlei.10 They have endeavored to show the pragmatic development of the freedom of the
seas and have rightly pointed to the relativity of the rights of states
in that sphere. The standards of legality on which their argument
rests are two-fold: it is permissible to do what is reasonable between
the parties", and also what is demanded by the security of the nuclear
powers.' 2 Both points are valid under existing law, and yet they may
cause serious misgivings in the present context. Reasonableness is
treated by these authors as a rather one-sided affair. They are more
concerned with the question of what actions of the nuclear powers
can with reason be justified in terms of strategic requirements than
with the extent to which other states can be reasonably expected to
tolerate their deleterious effects. But perhaps it could be argued
that in all international law there is necessarily a presumption in
favor of the strong, since it is they alone who can maintain a modicum
of order in international society. The security test resting on the wellestablished doctrine of self-defense, recognized by both customary international law and the United Nations Charter, may also evoke
some apprehension. There can in principle, of course, be no argument with the authors' contention that the sovereign state must have
"the right . . . to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs

in which it will be too late to protect itself."' 3 Unfortunately, however, the right of self-defense has normally tended to elude precise
definition and has often played havoc with international law. In time
of peace this right has been hedged in by more or less well-defined
9. E.g., Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law,
64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955).
10. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
11. Id. at 660.
12. Id. at 676-82, 686.
13. Id. at 676.
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rules; however, these become inapplicable as soon as self-defense is
resorted to in war. These limitations are essential if any semblance
of a legal order is to be preserved. However, McDougal and Schlei
would stretch the right of self-defense of the United States in relation
to nuclear testing to the point of eliminating most restraints, and
one may well wonder whether there remains any law at all if such
permissive interpretations are countenanced. It should also be noted
that one would be hard put to justify self-defense in time of peace
against innocent third parties suffering from the effects of nuclear
testing.
Although a violation of the freedom of the seas by nuclear tests
is hard to deny, it does not perhaps create a desperate problem; and
one may in fact be inclined to tolerate it, especially if one chooses to
consider the seas res nullius rather than res communis. A more serious problem is posed by the lack of finiteness of the air, which, unlike land and sea, does not know vertical limits; contamination of
the maritime air will not stop at coastal lines. Treatment of the airspace over land continues to be a controversial and much-debated
subject. There has been a persistent tendency to derive the rules oi
air law from the law of the sea. This analogy is hardly proper today,
although it still manifests itself in some specific rules for air traffic.
Not only is it invalidated by the fact that the sea is free and the air
is not, 14 but the problem of air law is also altogether different. International law could plausibly be based, as it has been in the past, on
the delimitation and contrast of land and sea. However, since man
is a three-dimensional creature, he cannot live in the two-dimensional
realm of land or sea without simultaneously claiming the air above
them. 15 Since the First World War the doctrine of complete sovereignty over a state's air space has therefore been generally accepted; that
is, air space now has the same legal status as the subjacent territory.161
This principle was confirmed in the Paris Convention of 1919 and reaffirmed in the Chicago Convention of 1944. It is true that a number
of mutual concessions have been made by the signatories of the latter
convention; but it is equally true that the concessions made voluntarily refer exclusively to peaceful and innocent purposes, with the
assumption that the complete sovereignty of the subjacent state usque
ad coelum has been fully preserved. In other words, none of the concessions signify a change in the general international law governing
such jurisdictions.
14. The analogy has been severely criticized in McNAR, THE LAw oF THE AiR
233 (2d ed. 1953).
15. For an interesting statement of the peculiarities of air law and especially
air war, see CARL ScHMrtr, DioR Nollos DFR ERDF IM V61LKERRECH1 DFS JUs PUBLICUX
EUROPAEUM 288 (1950).
16. MGNAIR, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7.
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Under the rules of international law the state may protect life
and property in its territory against radiation and pollution. It has
been conceded in a recent study that a state may defend itself against
contamination caused by ships carrying radioactive materials by enacting restrictions and regulations, even by excluding ships from
coastal waters.1 If we reflect for a moment upon the basis of political
obligation, we shall recall that obedience to its norms ultimately
rests on the willingness and ability of the state to protect its subjects. Since serious harm may and does result from nuclear tests- be
they atmospheric or subaqueous - to people within their countries,
the integrity of which sovereign authority has been established to protect, there is no reason why the right of self-protection conceded in
the maritime realm should not be extended to the airspace. Conversely, the right of self-protection against radioactive pollution of the
air would presumably impose the duty upon nuclear powers to refrain,
in time of peace, from actions causing injury to the territory or interests of other states. 8
Doubts expressed as to the legality of nuclear tests are reinforced
by the possible conflict with the laws or dictates of humanity. I shall
not attempt to examine the question whether such laws have or have
not become part of customary international law. However, the
growing tendency to include humanitarian prohibitions in the laws
of war is unmistakable, even though their legal basis has been a vexing problem. The attempt, in the absence of norms, to base the pertinent parts of the Nuremberg judgment on the debellatio of the German state 0 does not appear to be a particularly happy device; it
sounds more like a contrivance to make the crime fit the punishment.
A more solid basis can perhaps be found in the "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," which have gained increasing
favor during this century as a source of positive legal norms. If such
tendencies prevail in relation to the conduct of war, it can be plausibly
argued, as the International Court of Justice has done in the Corfu
Channel (Merits) case, 20 that such considerations are "even more
exacting in peace than war." 21 The view that the dictates of humanity
are quickly becoming part of the general international law is also
supported by the adoption in many states of the Genocide Convention
of 1948 and other conventions designed to put a stop to the most
drastic excesses in war or peace. The Genocide Convention does not,
of course, apply to nuclear tests because no "intention of destroying"
17.
TIvrriES
18.
19.
20.
21.

& BERMAN,
128, 175 (1960).
Cf. id.at 276.
HYDEtMAN

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NuCLEAR MARITImE Ac-

Cf. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NucLEAR WEAPONs 44 (1958).

[1949] I.CJ. Rep. 4.
Id. at 22.
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certain groups of men is involved. Endeavors to strengthen humanitarian considerations no doubt are very much in the air, and civilized nations can and will lend their support to such efforts. Of course,
the problem will be aggravated in time of war, since such considerations will continue to be balanced against strategic needs of the
belligerents. Although the legal basis for including humanitarian
dictates is still uncertain, the general principle is likely to be firmly
grounded in international law before long.
It can be conceded that international law does not contain any
automatic limitations on the freedom to possess, test, or use nuclear
weapons..2 2 A good case can be made, however, against the legality
of nuclear tests in time of peace on a scale sufficient to contaminate
areas or pollute the air outside the jurisdiction of the testing state.
Since nuclear devices probably must be considered as poisoned weapons within the meaning of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, as well as the Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gases and Analogous Materials of 1925,23 the prohibitions apply even more compellingly in time of peace to the incalculable poisonous effects of nuclear
tests upon innocent parties. However, it is evident that the nuclear
powers are not prepared to accept the existing prohibitions but feel
the need for making special arrangements to govern nuclear armaments. It must be remembered that the rules of law governing sovereign collectivities, when forced to rely largely on self-help for their
protection and the enforcement of their rights, must necessarily be
general, frequently vague, and subject to many exceptions. Most of
the rules have in fact been the result of pragmatic adjustments of
conflicting interests and legitimate concerns of the subjects. However, no legal order worthy of the name can be overly permissive.
Eventually the point may be reached where exceptions are so frequent and far-reaching as to supersede principles.
In view of the nature of the present international conflict, it
would of course be less than realistic to deny the need for developing
nuclear arms and conducting nuclear tests. I am not, therefore,
questioning for a moment the overwhelming military necessity of resuming or continuing such tests. It would indeed be difficult to condemn action dictated by a well-founded concern for one's security, and
there would be little virtue in a legal order exacting compliance to
the point of self-destruction. Even in the sphere of morality, which
frequently consists of more stringent rules than law, choice of action
is limited by the existing practicable alternatives. Those who guide
the affairs of state can therefore be held to compliance with specific
and clearly circumscribed rules only if they are within the realm of
22.
23.

SCHVARZENBERGER,

op. cit. supra note 19, at 11.

Cf. id. at 48.
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genuine choices. When law ignores the necessity of making concessions to political fact, it is beyond the hope of realization. The mainspring of human action is the drive for self-preservation, a fact of
life that many schools of thought and international lawyers have
fully recognized as a guiding factor in formulating specific rules. It
must be included in the statesman's calculations, lest his country come
to grief. Statesmen cannot fairly be asked to do more than exercise
prudence in charting the course of policy in accordance with historical necessity and be guided by a sympathetic concern for the effects
of his actions upon his fellow men. The utmost he can do is to pursue the morally best course permitted by existing conditions. I should
therefore be more than reluctant to join in a condemnation of nuclear tests because of a violation of formal legal rules as they exist at
present. Rather, I am inclined to question the adequacy of such
rules under conditions created by both the nuclear revolution and
the unusual alignment of forces in the world since 1945 commonly
known as bipolarism. My reservations concerning the adequacy of
present international law refer essentially to three areas: the dichotomy
between the laws of war and the laws of peace, the theory of sovereignty, and the treatment of air space on the basis of analogies derived from the law of the land and the law of the sea.
If we concluded earlier that nuclear tests contravene existing international law, our interpretation was of necessity based on the law
of peace, since its rules alone are applicable in the absence of a state
of war in the technical sense. But we may wonder whether the law of
peace can actually cope with the present situation. There is indeed
reason to doubt whether in actual fact we are presently at peace or
at war. The answer will determine whether the laws of peace or the
laws of war apply. It is normally said that we are engaged in a "cold
war," which, to paraphrase George Orwell, means that peace is war
and that the contemporary state of affairs must be comprehended under both headings. One may perhaps wonder at first sight whether
the term "cold war" is more than a journalistic phrase suggesting an
unawareness that peace has never been a paradisiac condition but
has invariably rested on a tenuous foundation. Upon further thought
it will appear that the cold war is a unique condition, essentially different from either war or peace in the traditional sense. The relativity
of war and peace is not of course a recent concern or discovery. The
views of the German generals Clausewitz and Ludendorff are well
known, and the matter has again been the subject of scholarly debate
during the past few decades. However, the problems posed by the
cold war are even more complex than legal scholarship has thus far
been willing to admit.
We have already said that the cold war is not a state of war in
the technical sense. What distinguishes it from peace in the customary
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sense is the fact that international politics now stand entirely under
the shadow of polar tensions between two hegemonies constantly
threatening to disrupt the delusive peace. In this uneasy situation,
military action is of secondary importance; the primary concern of
both sides is political. That is, the fateful decisions are made in the
political arena rather than on the field of battle. The seriousness of
the threat emanating from contemporary weapons, combined with
the exigencies of the bipolar balance of power, has tended to subordinate all political and social goals to the single purpose of winning a total victory. Politics and military affairs, therefore, are no
longer separable. The task of politics has been reduced to the support of military strategy, and the main value of military means lies
in their deterrent effect upon, rather than in, war. Policies are pursued by subtle means, such as constitutional conformity, peace offensives, economic aid, political fifth columns, and propaganda. In this
way the cold war has been converted into something resembling international civil war, in which the ideological has been substituted
for the military contest. As a result, means and ends have been fused
and confused beyond the possibility of disentanglement.
Since this state of affairs is not likely to be changed in the near
future, it may be worth-while to consider the advisability of abandoning both the law of war and the law of peace and substituting something new that is better attuned to reality. Dr. Jessup's perceptive
analysis as well as his thoughtful suggestion that a third state of
"intermediacy" be created2 4 also seems somewhat amiss, since it is
based on a misleading analysis of the cold war and leaves unsolved
the problem of invoking the state of intermediacy. Actually, the cold
war is less an intermediate stage between war and peace than a
phase of total war. It is constantly with us, and there is little chance
that it can be overcome as long as a nuclear bipolar balance exists.
If the law were changed, we could just as well abandon the legal
classification of peace, since nothing real corresponds to it. The
new "law of cold war" would have to be adapted to changed methods
of warfare. It would above all rest on the assumption that if world
problems developed into a "hot war," nuclear bombs would inevitably
be used. The effects of these weapons, eminently adapted to the total
war that bipolarism has bequeathed unto us, cannot be limited. The
impossibility of limiting warfare would also demand the abolition of
the law of war. Although the traditional rules of warfare have made
more than ample concessions to the demands of what the Germans
have called Kriegsrdson (ulterior demands of war), their purpose has
been to reduce permissiveness in war in order to preserve civilization
24. Editorial, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status
Between Peace and War?, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 98-103 (1954).
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in face of the necessities of war and to avoid "return to complete
anarchy." 21 The law of the cold war should be oriented more toward
political and economic affairs than military matters. At the same
time, it would be possible to adopt rules that in many ways are less
permissive than the traditional laws of war. For example, it would
not be necessary to intern nationals of the opposing bloc; and, in
the same vein, the duties of neutrals could be relaxed.
One may argue that the abolition of the laws of peace and war
in favor of a new law of cold war would represent retrogression rather
than progress, inasmuch as this traditional division made some precision possible in defining legal rights and duties and imposed some
limitations, however rudimentary. All of these advantages would be
lost if the distinction were given up, and humanity would be apt to
relapse into barbarous practices. This concern, though valid, is not
realistic. The limitations of war have suffered a perilous decline
during the two world wars of our century. For example, the traditional distinction between the treatment of combatant and noncombatant enemies in total war has become blurred, if not obliterated,
and is wholly irrelevant, since everyone is a combatant. Nor do the
nature of modern weapons and the political exigencies of bipolar war
tolerate any strictures upon the methods of warfare. Furthermore, war
as a legal status has become increasingly unfashionable and unpopular, as the experiences of the 1930's have shown only too clearly. There
is reasonable doubt as to whether war, in the legal sense, has not been
abolished by treaties, such as the League of Nations Covenant, the
United Nations Charter, and numerous conventions adhered to by a
large number of states, thereby leaving no scope for the laws of war.
The status of neutrals too has suffered a melancholy fate in recent
times, notwithstanding the protection provided by existing law; the
disappearance of the distinction between conditional and unconditional contraband, the doctrine of continuous voyage, the rationing of
neutral imports, and the navicert system are examples of their dwindling rights. Even their most sacred right, the inviolability of their
territory, in fact has never effectively restricted the traditional right
of belligerent states to make war upon any state they chose. In
other words, the determination of rights and duties of neutrals has
always been a highly pragmatic affair and their status tenuous at
best. Moreover, the future of neutrality looks anything but promising.
Now that the world has accepted a new version of the bellum justum,
there is little room for it, and it has practically ceased to be a respectable status since the end of the first World War. The bipolar
balance of power has tended to reduce neutrality to an anomaly, and
as tensions increase so will the world's impatience with neutrals.
25.

Schwarzenberger, Functions and Foundations of 'the Laws of War, 44

AtcHV FOR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 352

(1958).
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Perhaps the most compelling argument for the abolition of the
laws of war is the disappearance of war itself except as an apocalyptic
spectacle. By that I mean that war has ceased to be an instrument
that can be rationally used to implement policy. If it comes, it is
more than likely to signal the end of civilization, if not the end of
all life. Surely the present rules designed to limit the radius of destructive force will be inapplicable; in any event, it is unlikely that
there will be time to invoke them. Thus, the laws of war can have
meaning under modern conditions only in brush-fire actions, and
even then their applicability is doubtful because of the tendency of
the United Nations to move in, not as a belligerent but as a policeman.
My second reservation concerns the validity of the theory of
sovereignty; it strikes at the very root of traditional international law.
Founded on the Grotian system, this theory has accepted the state
as the basic and ultimate unit of international society and has extended to a multiplicity of mutually independent and more or less
equal states. The categories provided by the Grotian system, which
were valid only for a limited period of history (1648-1945, if one
wants to assign specific dates), are of little usefulness in the bipolar
world. Perhaps the time is ripe for a fundamental reconstruction of
international law such as was undertaken in the seventeenth century
by Hugo Grotius, who felt it necessary to adapt basic principles of
law to the new political fact of the sovereign state. Constructive
thinking on international law today must face up to a similar situation.
The political novelty of our days lies in the fact that most sovereignties have waned, while only two have waxed. It is no longer possible
to take seriously John Marshall's dictum that "Russia and Geneva
have equal rights."26 The world is dominated today by two superpowers whose military potential cannot be matched by any other
power or combination of powers. They are clearly sui generis and
cannot be fitted into the same categories as lesser states without producing serious distortions and imbalances. They are surrounded by
a host of satellites who usually, though not invariably, do their bidding. The status of these de facto dependencies cannot be comprehended in traditional terms. They differ from colonial dependencies
of the pre-war world both in essence and in their relations to the
metropolis. The superpowers find it neither possible nor desirable to
subject them to formal territorial jurisdiction; on the other hand,
the satellites have retained a measure of independence by virtue of
their ability to play the superpowers against each other. At the
same time, defections or resistances to polar policies by satellites are
matters of grave concern. Empires have therefore been liquidated
and converted into formal alliances, while the latter have tended in
26.

The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
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substance to approach increasingly the status of empires. As for neutrals, their status, as we have suggested earlier, has become precarious
in the bipolar world, and any reference to their sovereign independence is at best a euphemism. The relations between the superpowers
themselves will of necessity have to remain tense. It is unlikely that
the cold war will be overcome through the settlement of fundamental
issues. The precarious balance prevents both sides from making even
minor concessions. Equally, technological progress tends to disturb
the equilibrium. Neither side can therefore acquiesce in innovations
in the opponent's technology without trying to match them. Consequently, there is no alternative to the race in atomic weapons, no
matter how distasteful it may be to the powers involved and how disastrous its effect upon the world at large.
It follows that in the bipolar world different types of relations
exist among the political entities making up international society,
implying differences in rights and duties. We can easily recognize
four distinct categories: (1) relations between the superpowers, (2)
intra-bloc relations between a superpower and its satellites, (3) transbloc relations with the opponent's satellites, and (4) relations among
and with neutrals. Any system of international law that will be useful
in the contemporary world must acknowledge these differences.
A third reservation concerning the adequacy of international law
arises with respect to the rules governing the utilization of airspace.
Interesting observations pertaining to this matter were made at the
Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law. John A. Johnson pointed to the failure of customary and treaty
law to define "airspace" and to establish a universally accepted and
acceptable vertical boundary.2 7 John R. Williams contended that "it
would still be necessary in any international forum to prove the
existence of a rule of customary international law recognizing that
the subjacent territorial state had unlimited sovereignty over the airspace above it."28 Regardless of whether one accepts these views, they
are worth noting as illustrations of the uncertainties that still surround
the law of the air. They also suggest that since airspace, unlike land
and sea, cannot be clearly limited and circumscribed, rules based
on analogies with land law and sea law are not apt to remain satisfactory in the long run. Since aerial warfare has made it possible to
block unprecedentedly large maritime areas, thereby appreciably curtailing the traditional freedom of the sea, the rules of the open sea
have lost much of their utility, casting some doubt on their continued
validity. It is easy to understand why jurists should have attempted
27.

AMERICAN

SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF 55TH ANNUAL

(1961).
Id. at 181.

M.EETING 166

28.
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initially to regulate the new phenomenon by means of analogies to
land and sea law; but it is evident that these analogies do not hold,
29
and they are more likely to confuse than to clarify.

In suggesting the need for a fundamental revision of international
law, I do not intend to make a case for sociological jurisprudence. I
am quite willing to acknowledge law as a normative science. However,
little is gained by considering law a good in itself. It is good only to
the extent to which it serves man's basic desire for order and for the
civilized life. To be sure, this does not reduce law to the role of a
handmaiden of popular whims and passions. Law does not and perhaps should not aspire to popularity. Law in the highest sense must
be a means to realize that which is noble and spiritual in man; it
must make possible the civilized life. However, a system of law that
becomes so abstract as to lose all relationship to reality can only
create chaos. A case in point is the experiences of the inter-war period,
when the rigidity of international law brought the world ever closer
to war.
Nobody is more aware of the need for concordance between law
and reality than the political scientist. Politics is the art of the possible. Law, the offspring of the creative political act, is the instrument
for maintaining the best social order possible under existing conditions, a society compatible with the nature and ends of man. Of
course, a revision of international law will not solve the problems
brought on by nuclear arms technology and bipolarism. But such
a revision may bring more certainty and order into human relations
by being in step with reality, rather than by trying to create a paradise
out of a world that does not exist. It seems no more realistic to stake
exaggerated hopes for the solution of the problems confronting us on
arrangements made by means of multi-national treaties. We have
seen ample evidence in recent years of the insuperable obstacles to the
banning of nuclear bombs. The problem is not only political but of
general human scope. As long as the explosion of nuclear devices will
extend man's range of knowledge, there is little chance for test and
armaments bans. Man will not voluntarily give up his endeavors to
push forward the frontiers of knowledge. If the quest for knowledge
endangers his physical existence, as is presently the case, the problem,
if it can be solved, is not one for lawyers or political scientists but
rather for nuclear scientists.

29.

Cf. Carl Schmitt, op. cit. supra note 15, at 293-99.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss1/2

12

